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The private equity (PE) industry has been growing in the last decades, helping to increase 
the number of merger and acquisition, therefore boosting the competition of industry and multiple 
prices in acquisition. PE firms present different features (compared to other investors) that might 
influence them to pay less for a target: PE investors requires greater returns due to illiquidity of the 
investment; there are no synergy gains in PE deals; the past experience of PE firms develops 
acquisition skills; and, some entrepreneurs want to receive investments from PE o make use of 
their know how and credibility. In a PE investment, even a successful development of a target with 
a good exit strategy should result in an unsuccessful deal if the PE firms pay high prices in the 
acquisition. For this reason, this article focuses on investigating if private equity companies have 
been more efficient in acquisition process than other investors. 





1 Introduction  
The merger and acquisition activity have been growing by 6.1% since 1995, reaching US$ 
3.6 trillion and 49,078 deals in 2016 (Figure 1). Part of this increase was driven by the Private 
Equity (PE) activity which increased more than 10.6% in the same period and reached US$ 257 
billion in 2016 – an increasingly participation from 3.0% in 1995 to 7.1% in 2016. According to 
Bain &Company, in 2016 the Private Equity investments around the world reached US$ 257 billion 
(Figures 2), with a fund raising of US$ 589 billion and total exit value of US$ 328 billion. 
Figure 1: Global Private Equity total deal value (US$ billion) 
Source: Bain and company 
Figure 2: Global M&A total deal value (US$ billion) 
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As a consequence of the increase in M&A activity (which includes PE deals), the 
competition to acquire a company increases and drives up the acquisition multiples. The acquisition 
price is an important issue for PE firms: if the company pays too much for the target, even a 
successful process to increase company´s EBITDA and an effective exit strategy should not be 
enough for a successful deal. So, while there are numerous Private Equity studies that focus on the 
value creation and the exit process, this article concentrates in the acquisition process as an 
important issue for the PE investments. An analysis is made about whether Private Equity funds 
are capable of purchasing companies at a discount from strategic investors, expecting some skills 
and characteristics - as stated below - of PE firms to lead them to pay less than no PE firms. 
Caselli (2010, p. 4) defines the aim of a Private Equity investment as “the provision of 
capital and management expertise to create value and, consequently, generate big capital gains after 
the deal”. In a simple way, a private equity fund buys a company, aiming to create value by 
developing the company and exits the company by selling it to other company or throughout an 
IPO. In a typical PE investment, the value creation comes from three main key drivers: (i) 
improvement in management and governance, which is reflected on the increase in operating 
revenues and the reduction of costs and expenses; (ii) the improvement in capital structure (cash 
generation and benefit of tax shield): PE firms use to be more intense in terms of debt leverage 
than strategic buyers, which are reflected in higher tax shields. Besides, the higher leverage drives 
to higher IRR (Internal rate of return) since it decreases the amount of equity invested; and, (iii) 
the Multiple Arbitrage, which is the difference between the exit multiple and the acquisition 
multiple (Duarte, 2017). 
PE firms performance, from the perspective of their investors (limited partners) is measured 
in terms of Internal Rate of Return (IRR), which is the total return of the investment considering 
the time effect of the cash flows. A representative portion of returns for the management of a PE 
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firms comes from the “carry” fee (carried interest), which is an alignment mechanism between 
limited partners and general partners linked with the performance of investments made by the firm. 
Therefore, the higher the IRR, the higher payments the management will receive (Duarte, 2017). 
For this reason, in order to increase the IRR of the deal, PE firms should be able to pay 
lower acquisition multiples than strategic investors. There are some specific skills and features of 
private equity funds that should result in lower multiples. A relevant feature come from the 
potential synergies in non-PE deals that don’t occur for PE firms. The greater the estimated value 
of synergy, the more the investor will be willing to pay on an acquisition and, consequently, the 
higher will be the acquisition multiple. On the other hand, PE companies do not have synergy gains 
in acquisitions reducing the potential gains. Hence, considering potential synergies it is expected 
that PE firms pay lower in acquisitions than strategic investors. 
Another relevant factor that influences prices is the illiquidity profile of Private Equity 
investments. From the perspective of PE investors (limited partners), a PE investment has a lower 
liquidity than a large range of assets that they could invest (shares of listed companies, treasury 
bill, etc.). In order to compensate, investors require greater returns from Private Equity funds, 
pressuring PE firms to acquire companies as cheap as possible. 
Moreover, the acquisition process of PE is recurrent and well structured, enhancing 
acquisition skills, which should be reflected in lower acquisition multiples – Track record theory. 
In addition, some entrepreneurs want to receive investments from private equity funds since they 
believe that PE resources and know-how should increase the likelihood of an IPO or the sale of the 
company. Thus, it creates a bargaining power for PEs that should be reflected in lower multiples. 
The article studies the difference in acquisition multiple price of PE deals, when compared 
to non-PE deals (strategic investors) and I propose that the presence of a PE fund as an acquirer 
has a negative relation with the acquisition multiple price in a deal. There is a huge concentration 
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of PE studies in developed countries, mainly in the USA and European countries. So, I expect to 
contribute for literature by focusing this research on the emerging countries that compound the 
BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China). 
In order to test the hypothesis, a multiple linear regression was used where the responsible 
variable is the multiple acquisition prices of deals (EV/EBITDA – Enterprise Value over EBITDA) 
and the main explanatory variable (PE) is a dummy which indicates whether at least one of the 
acquirers is a private equity company. I included the following control variables in the model: 
target´s sector, a dummy that indicates whether the target company is a listed company, the log of 
the deal size and a variable to control the momentum of the markets. Analyses were run to 
investigate if different acquisition multiples have different results and I also ran the model with 
each country individually. As robustness check, a propensity score matching test was run as well. 
The results corroborate with the expectations for the hypothesis, evidencing that PE funds 
buy companies at lower prices than strategic investors: according to the model, at an average 
discount of 2.0 in terms of EV/EBITDA. The models that consider other multiples also corroborate 
with the hypothesis, except for the Equity Value/Net Income, however this last multiple is affected 
by financial leverage. The Propensity score matching, confirm the findings, indicating a negative 
relation between the presence of PE as an acquirer and the multiple paid. 
These findings contribute to the literature of Private Equity by focusing on the acquisition 
process and the ability of PE firms to buy companies at a discount. This study can derive two 
extensions for further research, namely the impact of the acquisition multiple in the return obtained 




2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Formulation 
The industry of merger and acquisition has been growing at 6.1% per year since 1995, 
reaching US$ 3.6 trillion in 2016. Despite being one of the most frequent strategies adopted by 
companies to grow, there are numerous studies showing evidence of a reduced success rate for 
M&A. A recent study in Harvard Business Review (Christensen, et al. 2013), pointed out that 
between 70% and 90% of M&A deals did not create value to shareholders. KPMG (1999) indicates 
a rate of 83% of deals that did not increase shareholder returns and Mckinsey (1990) study pointed 
out that only 23% of the deals got returns on capital higher than the cost of capital, while 60% 
obtained a lower return. 
Bieshaar, Knight and van Wassenaer (2011) studied stock exchanges in America and 
Europe and found that more than 50% of mergers and acquisitions did not increase shareholder 
value. Another evidence from failure in M&A comes from studies that measure the rate of 
acquisitions that are reversed. According to Mitchell and Lehn (2000), 20.2% of the acquisitions 
made between 1982 and 1986 were divested by 1988, while Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) found 
that the reverse rate reached 44% of the mergers in their sample. 
A relevant portion of the deals that does not create value to the shareholders is related to a 
high value paid by the acquirers (Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992). One of the main explanations for 
the high value paid is the overestimation of synergy gains by the acquirers. Synergy gains in a 
merge occur when the value of the companies combined are higher than the sum of the value of 
two companies alone. Some examples are the decrease of costs by merging departments of the two 
companies and the reduction of financial debt cost due to new debt structure. There is evidence that 
synergies are related to a positive abnormal return to a bidder in an M&A deal (Halpern, 1982) 
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and, as a result, synergies are among the most important reasons for companies when deciding to 
acquire another company. Bhide (1990) stated that operating synergies synergy was the main 
motive in one-third of 77 acquisitions between 1985 and 1986. 
The greater the estimated value of synergy, the more the investor will be willing to pay on 
an acquisition and, therefore, the higher the acquisition multiple will be. Besides, companies often 
overestimate the potential synergies, further increasing the purchase price. Sirower (1997) by 
studying the promises and failures of synergy, concludes that synergy is frequently promised but 
rarely completely (or partially) delivered. 
Differently from mergers and acquisition of the strategic investors, Private Equity does not 
have synergy gains in the acquisition of a company – except for some special cases. Thus, potential 
gains in the investment are reduced, and it is expected that they pay lower acquisition multiple 
when compared to the strategic investors. 
The illiquidity profile of Private Equity investments is another relevant issue to influence 
the difference of acquisition prices between PE and no-PE deals. From the viewpoint of Private 
Equity investors, a PE investment is more illiquid when compared to a large range of assets that 
they could invest – shares of listed companies, treasury bonds, money market funds, mutual funds, 
etc. – Since it is more difficult to sell the fund shares at a fair value. In order to compensate the 
lack of liquidity, investors require an illiquidity premium, reflecting higher required returns from 
Private Equity funds, and consequently, a pressure to acquire companies as cheap as possible. 
Moreover, some authors found evidence that the experience and the repetition of PE 
investment cycle result in benefits for the next deals. Minardi, Bortoluzzo and Moreira (2017) 
found evidence that funds with more deals reduce their likelihood of having total loss, benefitted 
by learning how to select better deals and increase the network to access better deals. Also, 
Humphery-Jenner (2013) argues that PE funds benefits from knowledge sharing and learning from 
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its previous funds, by studying the diversification of funds. In the same way, since the acquisition 
is a recurrent and structured process in PE companies, I expect benefits from the previous 
acquisitions. The experience in closing deals results in higher negotiation skills and shorter period 
for the acquisition to be concluded – track record of acquisition process. As a consequence, it is 
expected to result in lower acquisition prices. 
Additionally, some entrepreneurs wish to receive investment from PE funds to make use of 
their expertise and network, creating a bargain power for those funds. Being backed by a PE firm 
should represent a sign of quality to the market (Carter & Manaster, 1990; Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 
1999) and it is expected to increase the likelihood of the entrepreneurial exit, through IPO (Initial 
Public Offer) or being acquired (Ragozzino and Blevins, 2016). Due to this bargain power theory, 
I expect that PE funds should be able to pay lower acquisition multiples than strategic investors. 
Thus, considering the lack of potential gains with synergy, the pressure from investors to 
pay less (illiquidity profile), the track record in acquisition process, and the preference of 
companies to be acquired by PE firms, I expect a negative relation between the deals of PE firms 
and the acquisition multiple price. 
 
Hypothesis: The acquisition multiples paid by PE firms are lower than the multiples 
paid by other classes of acquirers. 
 
 A relevant factor that could influence acquisition multiple is the momentum of the 
economy. According to Gompers and Lerner (2000) and Axelson, et al. (2013), in periods of 
expansion of economy, investments are often executed at high valuations (higher acquisition 
multiples). In order to control by this effect, I included in the model the price earnings from the 
country's stock market of the target company at the year that the deal happened. 
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As previously commented, the illiquidity of Private Equity investment makes the investor 
pressure the PE fund to pay less in acquisition. However, in some cases, PE firms buy companies 
that have already been listed in the stock market, which greatly increases the liquidity of 
investments, and therefore should increase the acquisition multiple. Thus, a control variable has 
been included, indicating whether the target company is listed on the stock exchange or not. 
Besides that, there is evidence that the size of the deal might influence acquisition prices. 
According to Lopez-de-Silanes, et al. (2011), larger deals generally perform more poorly in 
comparison to smaller deals. A possible explanation is the higher bargain power of large companies 
in the acquisition process, which is expected to result in higher acquisition multiple. Therefore, the 
log of the size of the deal has been included as a control variable. 
3 Database and descriptive analysis 
I collected the data from Bloomberg´s M&A deals section. I found 51,365 M&A deals in 
BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) countries between 1990 and 2017: 7,088 PE and 44,277 
No-PE. Excluding the deals without information of EV/EBITDA, outliers and the deals before 
2000 since there are none or few PE deals, the final sample drops to a total of 1,881: 199 PE and 
1,682 non-PE deals.  
Figure 3 shows the number of deals and the total value per year of PE deals, while Figure 
4 shows a comparison between the average ticket size per year between deals with and without PE 
funds. Private equity deals represent 11% of the sample, with an average ticket of 208 million 
dollars, lower than non-PE deals (396 million dollars), with statistically significant difference. 
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Tables 1 and 2 show the number of deals and the average ticket size split per year and country of 
the sample. The PE sample is compound by 110 deals in India, 76 in China, 11 in Brazil and only 
2 in Russia. 
Figure 3: PE deals sample: Total Value (in US$ millions) and number of deals 
 
Source: Blomberg 



















PE average ticket Non-PE average ticket
12 
 
Table 1: Number of deals 
  Total Brazil Russia India China 
  PE Others %* 
 
 
PE Others %* 
PE 
PE Others %* 
PE 
PE Others %* 
 
PE Others %* 
 
2000 0 31 0% 0 17 0% 0 0 n.a 0 11 0% 0 3 0% 
2001 1 45 2% 0 3 0% 0 1 0% 1 37 3% 0 4 0% 
2002 1 88 1% 0 7 0% 0 0 n.a 1 39 3% 0 42 0% 
2003 10 103 9% 0 12 0% 0 1 0% 6 19 24% 4 71 5% 
2004 12 140 8% 1 19 5% 0 1 0% 9 27 25% 2 93 2% 
2005 12 143 8% 0 13 0% 0 6 0% 7 42 14% 5 82 6% 
2006 18 141 11% 0 10 0% 0 3 0% 10 33 23% 8 95 8% 
2007 24 138 15% 0 10 0% 0 17 0% 16 52 24% 8 59 12% 
2008 10 123 8% 2 19 10% 0 24 0% 6 47 11% 2 33 6% 
2009 10 94 10% 0 26 0% 0 3 0% 4 37 10% 6 28 18% 
2010 8 77 9% 2 17 11% 0 16 0% 6 26 19% 0 18 0% 
2011 20 81 20% 1 7 13% 0 9 0% 9 32 22% 10 33 23% 
2012 17 91 16% 0 6 0% 1 16 6% 10 35 22% 6 34 15% 
2013 15 98 13% 1 9 10% 0 9 0% 7 40 15% 7 40 15% 
2014 10 81 11% 1 19 5% 0 1 0% 4 34 11% 5 27 16% 
2015 19 110 15% 3 15 17% 1 4 20% 7 26 21% 8 65 11% 
2016 5 71 7% 0 4 0% 0 9 0% 2 11 15% 3 47 6% 
2017 7 27 21% 0 0 n.a 0 1 0% 5 7 42% 2 19 10% 
Total 199 1,682 11% 11 213 5% 2 121 2% 110 555 17% 76 793 9% 
* PE/Total 
Source: Blomberg 
Table 2: Average ticket size (in US$ millions) 
  Total Brazil Russia India China 













2000 -- 584 n.a -- 1015 n.a -- -- n.a -- 75 n.a -- 11 n.a 
2001 35 48 -28% -- 240 n.a -- 657 n.a 35 18 93% -- 27 n.a 
2002 38 50 -24% -- 96 n.a -- -- n.a 38 78 -51% -- 16 n.a 
2003 27 137 -80% -- 123 n.a -- 10520 n.a 24 41 -41% 32 18 76% 
2004 110 109 1% 84
2 
347 142% -- 1988 n.a 50 53 -6% 14 56 -74% 
2005 112 233 -52% -- 322 n.a -- 3591 n.a 11
5 
90 27% 109 41 163
% 2006 28 195 -86% -- 1061 n.a -- 1047 n.a 24 156 -85% 33 90 -63% 
2007 90 320 -72% -- 738 n.a -- 1497 n.a 10
1 
80 26% 70 141 -50% 
2008 84 531 -84% 13
5 
496 -73% -- 522 n.a 55 167 -67% 122 1095 -89% 
2009 123 360 -66% -- 851 n.a -- 498 n.a 75 53 43% 155 297 -48% 
2010 139 681 -80% 46
9 
829 -43% -- 1776 n.a 29 220 -87% -- 207 n.a 
2011 147 702 -79% 49
2 
4164 -88% -- 1742 n.a 66 142 -54% 187 212 -12% 
2012 297 650 -54% -- 1866 n.a 62
5 
1232 -49% 53 551 -90% 650 262 148
% 2013 218 365 -40% 16
6 
708 -77% -- 1184 n.a 10
6 
184 -43% 338 280 21% 
2014 203 414 -51% 44
4 
264 68% -- 220 n.a 8 199 -96% 310 790 -61% 




2193 -93% 89 110 -19% 133
9 
620 116
% 2016 160 760 -79% -- 1756 n.a -- 2376 n.a 19
9 
63 216% 133 529 -75% 
2017 102
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1999 -81% 80 130 -38% 454 291 56% 
* % Discount/Premium 
Source: Blomberg 
For the hypothesis, the responsible variable will be the multiple acquisition price of the 
deals, and the analysis will consider EV/EBITDA (enterprise value over the target´s earnings 
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before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization) as a proxy since it is largely adopted to 
measure the price of deals. The multiple is calculated considering the enterprise value (equity plus 
net debt) of the date that the deal was completed divided by the EBITDA of the last 12 months 
released before the deal was completed. The average multiple for PE deals is 12.2x, a discount of 
10% when compared to no-PE deals (13.5x). In the table 3, it is possible to see the average multiple 
of EV/EBITDA segment by PE and no-PE deal, year and country. 
Table 3: Average EV/EBITDA 
 Year Total Brazil Russia India China 
  PE Others %* PE Others %* PE Others %* PE Others %* PE Others %* 
2000 -- 8.5 n.a -- 6.6 n.a -- -- n.a -- 11.2 n.a -- 9.8 n.a 
2001 11.0 9.5 15% -- 4.6 n.a -- 1.7 n.a 11.0 8.7 25% -- 22.0 n.a 
2002 24.8 19.1 30% -- 6.5 n.a -- -- n.a 24.8 10.4 139% -- 29.2 n.a 
2003 13.6 20.2 -32% -- 7.3 n.a -- 6.7 n.a 5.4 10.8 -50% 25.9 25.1 3% 
2004 8.4 17.2 -51% 7.1 4.7 51% -- 3.9 n.a 7.1 10.4 -31% 14.8 21.9 -32% 
2005 12.4 13.5 -8% -- 5.2 n.a -- 4.9 n.a 11.8 11.5 2% 13.2 16.4 -19% 
2006 13.0 15.7 -17% -- 4.4 n.a -- 8.3 n.a 10.2 14.1 -28% 16.6 17.6 -6% 
2007 12.1 14.9 -19% -- 8.8 n.a -- 18.3 n.a 13.1 10.8 21% 10.1 18.6 -46% 
2008 14.8 13.3 11% 25.6 8.6 198% -- 13.9 n.a 12.2 11.3 8% 12.1 18.6 -35% 
2009 8.4 9.9 -16% -- 10.1 n.a -- 3.0 n.a 8.9 9.8 -9% 8.0 10.6 -24% 
2010 6.5 10.2 -36% 8.3 8.9 -7% -- 7.6 n.a 5.9 10.4 -43% -- 13.6 n.a 
2011 11.6 12.4 -6% 21.6 8.6 151% -- 13.0 n.a 9.1 11.3 -20% 12.9 14.1 -8% 
2012 11.6 8.7 34% -- 12.0 n.a 7.6 5.2 46% 10.9 8.5 27% 13.6 9.9 37% 
2013 10.2 9.8 3% 4.0 12.6 -69% -- 8.7 n.a 6.5 10.2 -37% 14.8 9.1 62% 
2014 11.2 11.6 -4% 14.8 8.6 72% -- 7.9 n.a 11.2 9.5 17% 10.5 16.6 -37% 
2015 13.6 14.4 -6% 13.9 7.3 89% 2.3 6.7 -65% 10.0 14.9 -33% 18.0 16.3 11% 
2016 13.0 13.6 -4% -- 8.9 n.a -- 8.1 n.a 12.2 14.2 -14% 13.6 14.9 -9% 
2017 10.2 15.5 -34% -- -- n.a -- 5.9 n.a 12.1 12.8 -6% 5.7 16.9 -66% 
Total 12.2 13.5 -10% 13.6 7.9 71% 5.0 7.7 -36% 10.7 11.2 -4% 13.6 17.1 -21% 
* % Discount/Premium 
Source: Blomberg 
I replicate the hypothesis using three different proxies for acquisition multiple: EV/EBIT, 
EV/Net Revenues, and Equity Value/Net Income, where EV is the enterprise value of the company. 




Table 4: Average EV/EBIT, EV/Net Revenues, and Equity Value/Net Income 
  PE  Non-PE Diference 
EV/EBIT 14.6 17.4 -2.7*** 
EV/Net Revenues 3.0 4.4 -1.4*** 
Equity Value/Net Income 16.4 14.1 2.3 
t test: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
Source: Blomberg 
The independent variable (or the interest variable) of the regression is PE, a dummy 
variable that indicates whether there is at least one PE firm between the acquirers of a deal (dummy 
=1), or not (dummy =0). Table 5 contain information of the number of deals, the average size of 
deals and the acquisition multiple segmented by the presence of PE or not. 
Table 5: Number of deals, average size of the deal (US$ million) and acquisition multiple 
  PE  Non-PE Difference 
# deals 199 1,682 n.a. 
Average ticket size 208 396 -188* 
Acquistion multiple 12.2 13.5 -1.3*** 
t test: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
Source: Blomberg 
The main control variables will be:  
• SECTOR DUMMIES – a set of dummies variables to the following industrial sectors: Basic 
Materials, Communications, Consumer-Cyclical, Consumer-Non-cyclical, Financial, 
Industrial, UET (Utilities, Energy and Technology) and Others (as the base scenario).  
• LISTED – a dummy variable that indicates if the target company was a public company at the 
moment of the acquisition (dummy =1), or not (dummy =0). Given the higher liquidity of listed 
companies, it is expected that they have higher acquisition multiples when compared to non-
listed companies. I expect a positive relation between Listed companies and acquisition 
multiple. 
• LOG DEAL SIZE – it represents the log of the size of the deal in terms of announced total 
value. It is expected that small companies are more susceptible to fail and have lower bargain 
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power, resulting in lower multiple of acquisition. Thus, I expect a positive relation between the 
log of deal size and the multiple of acquisition price. 
• MARKET PE – the price earnings of the country stock market corresponding to the country 
of the target company. This variable controls the momentum of each country during the 
acquisition, using the stock market as a proxy. I consider the IBOVESPA index as the proxy 
for the Brazilian stock market, the RTS index for Russia, the NIFTY 50 index for India and 
SSE composite index for China. I expect a positive relation between the Market PE and the 
acquisition multiple, since in moments that the market is very active it is expected that the stock 
market and the acquisition multiple are higher and, when the market is in recession, both figures 
are expected to be lower. 
• COUNTRY – a set of dummy variables to control prices for each country. Considering China 
as the base scenario, the dummy variable indicates whether the target company belongs 
(dummy =1), or not (dummy =0) to each of the other countries: Brazil, Russia and India. This 
variable will also be used in the alternative model, where it is expected that the negative relation 
between acquisition price and PE firms is sustained in each country. 
Table 6 compares the control variables between PE deals and non-PE deals, individualized 
by country. In general, the acquisition multiples in China are higher than in other countries, while 
in Brazil, the average multiple for PE deals are higher than non-PE deals. In the other three 




Table 6: Average EV/EBITDA of control variables 
 Variables Total Brazil Russia India China 
  PE Other Var. PE Other Var. PE Other Var. PE Other Var. PE Other Var. 
Log Deal Size 11.7 13.7 -2.0 14.3 7.9 6.4 5.0 10.2 -5.2 10.0 10.8 -0.7 13.8 17.8 -4.0 
Listed 13.5 16.7 -3.2 20.9 10.0 11.0 n.a. 10.5 n.a. 10.5 12.0 -1.6 14.4 18.0 -3.7 
Non-Listed 9.4 10.0 -0.6 6.3 7.1 -0.8 5.0 10.2 -5.2 9.9 10.6 -0.7 7.2 13.6 -6.4 
Basic Materials 9.8 11.7 -1.9 n.a. 7.5 n.a. n.a. 10.7 n.a. 8.4 8.8 -0.4 11.8 16.7 -4.9 
Communications 14.3 7.9 6.4 14.3 7.9 6.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Consumer 
(Cyclical) 
14.9 12.0 2.9 n.a. 5.1 n.a. n.a. 7.4 n.a. 18.3 14.4 3.9 13.7 21.1 -7.4 
Consumer  
(No Cyclical) 
10.3 15.1 -4.8 11.8 11.6 0.2 n.a. 4.6 n.a. 9.0 11.5 -2.4 12.5 17.7 -5.2 
Others 14.9 14.2 0.8 18.0 9.0 9.0 n.a. 9.9 n.a. 14.4 12.3 2.2 14.7 17.2 -2.5 
Financial 12.3 24.8 -12.6 4.0 6.3 -2.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.5 20.1 -15.6 28.3 26.1 2.3 
Industrial 10.6 15.0 -4.3 25.9 14.1 11.8 n.a. 16.3 n.a. 9.0 9.6 -0.6 8.2 17.9 -9.8 
UET 12.1 14.3 -2.2 n.a. 5.7 n.a. n.a. 8.6 n.a. 10.2 10.6 -0.4 14.6 18.4 -3.9 
Source: Blomberg 
4 Methodology  
Equation (1) shows the multiple linear regression model adopted in the analysis. 
 
𝐸𝑉𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑖  =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐸𝑖 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑥𝑗𝑖
𝑛
𝑗=2 +  𝜀𝑖     (1) 
 
Where: 
𝐸𝑉𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑖 is the acquisition multiple for the deal i; 
𝑃𝐸𝑖 indicates the presence (or not) of Private equity firm in the deal i; 
𝑥𝑖𝑗 is a set of control variables j for the deal i;  
𝜀𝑖 is the random error.  
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The null hypothesis (𝐻0: 𝛽1 = 0) implies in a statistically insignificant difference between 
the acquisition multiples of Private Equity deals and non-private equity deals; the alternative 
hypothesis (𝐻1: 𝛽1 ≠ 0) implies that there is a statistical difference in acquisition of PE deals.  
Model 1 shows the results of the regression that does not include any control variable; 
model 2 controls for sector dummies variables; model 3 includes the listed dummy; model 4 
considers the ln (deal’s size); model 5 includes country dummies, model 6 uses the momentum 
variable (Market PE); and, finally, model 7 includes all control variables simultaneously. In order 
to avoid the homoscedasticity error, I ran the regressions using robust standard errors. 
5 Results 
Table 7 shows the univariate linear regression results. I observe a negative relation between 
the acquisition prices of deals and the presence of PE firms as an investor. The results are 
statistically significant at 10% level and, in average, PE firms buy companies at 2.1 discount (in 
terms of EV/EBITDA) when compared to other investors. 
Table 7: Results of model 1 
EVEBITDA Coef. Robust Std. Err. T P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
PE -2.06 0.63 -3.29 0.00 -3.29 -0.83 
Cons 13.72 0.26 52.31 0.00 13.21 14.23 
Source: Blomberg and Rodrigo Olivares 
Table 8 contains the multiple regression models results considering the control variables. 
The models confirm the significant negative correlation between the PE dummy and EV/EBITDA 




Table 8: Results of Hypothesis using control variables 
  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 
      
PE -2.290*** -2.061*** -1.937** -1.723** -1.824** -1.541* 
  (-3.58) (-3.38) (-3.04) (-2.68) (-2.88) (-2.39) 
Basic Materials -12.23***     -7.258*** 
  (-5.78)     (-3.63) 
Communications -11.36***     -5.737** 
  (-4.97)     (-2.68) 
Consumer(Cyclical) -9.179***     -6.287** 
  (-4.33)     (-3.17) 
Consumer(No Cyclic~) -9.480***     -5.379** 
  (-4.50)     (-2.71) 
Financial -9.272***     -5.986** 
  (-4.19)     (-2.89) 
Industrial -9.628***     -6.212** 
  (-4.55)     (-3.12) 
UET -11.81***     -6.857*** 
  (-5.55)     (-3.39) 
LISTED  6.475***    2.073*** 
   (-14,48)    (-3,52) 
Log Deal Size   -0.773***   -0.401** 
    (-6.65)   (-3.17) 
Brazil    -9.331***  -5.925*** 
     (-15.62)  (-7.27) 
Russia    -7.471***  -0,462 
     (-7.57)  (-0.38) 
India    -6.581***  -3.737*** 
     (-13.01)  (-5.63) 
MARKET PE     0.359*** 0.223*** 
      (-12,06) (-6,84) 
Constant 23.93*** 10.11*** 16.63*** 17.61*** 6.739*** 17.93*** 
  (-11,75) (-34,51) (-29,95) (-44,16) (-11,51) (-8,18) 
 
      
Observations 1881 1881 1872 1881 1881 1872 
R-squared 0,034 0,097 0,028 0,129 0,093 0,185 
t statistics in parentheses 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
Source: Blomberg and Rodrigo Olivares 
These results corroborate the hypothesis proposed: PE firms acquire companies at lower 
prices than other investors. This should be an evidence that the experience in older acquisition 
processes increases negotiation skills (track record theory), investor pressures PE firms due to the 
low liquidity, the lack of potential synergy influences PE to pay less and/or companies are more 
willing to receive investments from PE firms (bargain power theory).  
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I also find positive relation between acquisition multiple with listed companies and the 
Market PE, as expected. On the other hand, the relation between multiple and log size is negative, 
likely reflecting higher leverage capacity of larger companies that allows private equity funds to 
pay more in the acquisition. 
Table 9 contains the results using other proxies for acquisition multiple: EV/EBIT, EV/Net 
Revenues and Equity Value/Net Income. Using the EV/EBIT (Model 8) and the EV/Net Revenues 
(Model 9), I found a negative and statistically significant relation between acquisition prices and 
the presence of PE funds as an acquirer, which corroborate with the hypothesis formulated. 
However, for Equity Value/Net Income (Model 10) the figures are not statistically significant and 
positive. Net Income is affected by the financial leverage, and once PE deals tend to have a higher 
leverage than other deals, this multiple is positively affected and more than compensates the lower 
price paid in the acquisition. 
Overall, the results were satisfactory and corroborate with the hypothesis: PE firm 




Table 9: Results considering other variables 
  Model 8 Model 9 Model 10    
  EV/EBIT EV/Net Revenues EquityValue/NetIncome 
    
PE -2.480** -1.131*** 0,264 
  (-3.25) (-3.83) (-0,33) 
Basic Materials -8.108** -2.844* -2,559 
  (-3.05) (-2.45) (-1.43)    
Communications -6.499* -2.331* -0,302 
  (-2.35) (-1.99) (-0.15)    
Consumer(Cyclical) -4,811 -2.856* -0,105 
  (-1.82) (-2.44) (-0.06)    
Consumer(No Cyclic~) -5.482* -1,922 1,078 
  (-2.07) (-1.65) (-0,61) 
Financial -5,245 0,856 -2,674 
  (-1.89) (-0,68) (-1.45)    
Industrial -6.260* -2.381* -1,031 
  (-2.37) (-2.05) (-0.59)    
UET -7.795** -1,911 -1,387 
  (-2.93) (-1.63) (-0.77)    
LISTED 2.229** 1.392*** 1.983*   
  (-3,18) (-4,00) (-2,52) 
Log Size 0,00124 -0,0237 1.402*** 
  (-0,01) (-0.37) (-11,08) 
Brazil -6.766*** -2.296*** 0,717 
  (-7.82) (-7.12) (-0,65) 
Russia -4.260*** -0,746 -3.597**  
  (-3.42) (-1.49) (-2.67)    
India -5.705*** -1.253** 2.253**  
  (-7.40) (-3.09) (-2,69) 
MARKET PE 0.192*** 0.0832*** 0,0556 
  (-5,43) (-4,87) (-1,79) 
Constant 21.73*** 4.573*** 7.859*** 
  (-7,71) (-3,65) (-3,90) 
    
Observations 1830 3068 2116 
R-squared 0,191 0,101 0,075 
t statistics in parentheses 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
Source: Blomberg and Rodrigo Olivares 
I run the analysis for each country individually: Brazil, Russia, India and China. Table 10 
provides the results of hypothesis proposed for each country. The regression for Russia (Model 12) 
and China (Model 14) resulted in a negative as well as statistically significant relation between 
acquisition price (EV/EBITDA) and deals with the presence of PE firms, while the results for India 
(Model 13) indicate a negative relation however not statistically significant and, finally, the figures 
for Brazil (Model 11), present a positive coefficient without a statistically significant relation. 
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Table 10: Results considering each country alone 
  Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
  Brazil Russia India  China 
     
PE 6,389 -5.235* -0,835 -4.021*** 
  (1.80) (-2.51) (-1.20) (-3.58)    
Constant 7.882*** 10.20*** 10.88*** 17.81*** 
  (18.95) (11.03) (30.13) (42.97) 
     
Observations 224 123 665 869 
R-squared 0,044 0,004 0,001 0,01 
t statistics in parentheses 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
Source: Blomberg and Rodrigo Olivares 
6 Robustness Check  
In order to check the efficiency and consistency of the hypothesis results, a Propensity Score 
Matching (PSM) test was run as a robustness check. While the original model (multiple linear 
regression) compares deals with and without the presence of Private Equity as an acquirer 
considering all the sample, in the PSM test each deal in treatment group (deals with the presence 
of a PE as an acquirer) were matched with deals in control group (no presence of PE) with similar 
observable characteristics. PSM attempts to decrease potential bias that could exist in the simple 
comparison between the group that received investment from a PE and the others that did not. I 
consider as the observable characteristics some control variables of the original model: Log Size, 
Listed, and Sector Dummies. 
In the analysis it is possible to obtain the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), 
which corresponds to the difference between the deals that were acquired by a Private Equity in 
comparison to their correspondent matches (without the presence of PE). In the test, ATT points 
out to a 2.3 lower EV/EBITDA for deals of PE when comparing to non-PE with similar 
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characteristics, being the results statistically significant at 10% level. Thus, PSM reinforces the 
hypothesis proposed, meaning that PE firms use to buy companies at lower price than other 
investors. (see table 11) 
Table 11: Results of Propensity score matching  
Source: Blomberg and Rodrigo Olivares 
7 Conclusion  
Being the acquisition process as important as the company development (increase in 
EBITDA) and the exit strategy in a PE deal, I examined the acquisition process in the universe of 
Private Equity funds. The hypothesis formulated analyzes whether PE funds buy companies at low 
acquisition multiples than other investors. 
The results have pointed out a negative relative between multiple price (EV/EBITDA) and 
the presence of a PE firm as an acquirer, confirming the hypothesis that PE firms buy companies 
at lower multiple prices than non-PE firms. The outcomes hold even after including control 
variables and after running alternative models (using other type of multiples and analyzing the 
countries alone) and a propensity score matching as a robustness check. Consequently, the results 
indicate the existence of relevant characteristics of PE firms such as: (i) Since the acquisition 
process in a PE firm is recurrent and structured, it creates a track record to find good deals and 
improve negotiation skills, reflecting in lower acquisition prices; (ii) Investors require a premium 
to compensate the low liquidity, pressuring PE funds to buy as cheap as possible; (iii) Strategic 
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
EVEBITDA Unmatched 11,660 13,733 -2,073 0,788 -2,630 
 ATT 11,660 13,964 -2,304 1,014 -2,270 
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investors pay more for an acquisition since they consider the potential gains from synergies; and, 
(iv) There is evidence that some entrepreneurs want to receive investments from PE firms as a 
signal of quality to the market and increase the likelihood of a future exit (Carter & Manaster, 1990; 
Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999; Ragozzino and Blevins, 2016), which creates a bargain power for 
PE. 
These findings contribute to the literature of Private Equity by focusing on the acquisition 
process and the ability of PE firms to buy companies at a discount. This study can derive two 
extensions for further research related to the acquisition process, such as: (i) The impact of the 
acquisition multiple in the return obtained in a deal (IRR) – how it influences the success of the 
deal and how paying less in the acquisition increase the return ; and, (ii) How the proximity of the 
investment period deadline (usually the third or the fourth year after the foundation of the fund) 
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